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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MICHAEL D. BURCH and THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE OF MICHAEL D. BURCH,

Plaintiff,

V.

RE: PRIVILEGED MATERIALS SUBMITTED UNDER SEAL FOR IN CAMERA INSPECTION PURSUANT TO COURT ORDER

NO. CIV. S-04-0038 WBS GGH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LARRY VANDERHOEF, GREG WARZECKA, PAM GILL-FISHER, ROBERT FRANKS, and LAWRENCE SWANSON,

Defendants.

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On July 22, 2005, the court issued an order directing defendants to produce certain documents. The court modified the order on July 29, 2005, to allow defendants to submit under seal all allegedly privileged documents to the court for in camera review. Defendants submitted the allegedly privileged documents on August 10, 2005 along with briefing to support defendants' assertions of privilege. Plaintiffs responded to defendants' briefing on August 17, 2005 and moved the court to reject all

defendants' claims of privilege and to compel defendants to produce all withheld and other responsive documents. Defendants replied to plaintiffs' response. The court now addresses defendants' privilege claims.

Defendants have refused to produce to plaintiffs certain documents that defendants claim are protected from disclosure by virtue of the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, deliberative process privilege, and/or a privacy-based privilege. Plaintiffs correctly point out that defendants waived any applicable evidentiary privileges by failing to timely provide plaintiffs with privilege logs and supporting declarations.

The party asserting evidentiary privileges has the burden of proving that the privileges apply to the documents or communications the party seeks to withhold. <u>In re: Grand Jury</u> Investigation v. The Corp., 974 F.2d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 1992) (dealing with attorney-client privilege); Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, L.P., 266 F.Supp.2d 1144, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (dealing with work product privilege); N. Pacifica, LLC v. City of Pacifica, 274 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (dealing with deliberative process privilege). To meet this burden, the party asserting a privilege must produce more than just "boilerplate objections or blanket refusals" in response to a request for production of documents. Burlington N. v. United States Dist. Court For the Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005). The burden may be met by the submission of a detailed privilege log, but only if such log is submitted in a timely manner. <u>Id.</u> at 1147. The log must also

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contain supporting affidavits or other competent evidence to prove the applicability of asserted privileges. <u>In re Heritage</u>
Bond Litig., 2004 WL 19700058 *2 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

In Burlington, a case decided just this year, the Ninth Circuit explained how district courts are to determine whether a privilege log was submitted in a timely manner. 408 F.3d at 1149. In deciding the issue, the <u>Burlington</u> Court first noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 sets a 30-day deadline for responding to a discovery request in writing. The court concluded that Rule 34 thus "imposes a bright-line rule" defining timeliness, but found that it contains no explicit prohibition against boilerplate objections or assertions of privilege. at 1147. The court went on to note, however, that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)1 does require that a proper assertion of privilege be more specific than a generalized, boilerplate objection. The court acknowledged that Rule 26(b)(5) does not "specifically correlate this [specificity] requirement with Rule 34's bright-line rule for timeliness, nor does it explicitly articulate a waiver rule." Id. However, in examining the notes accompanying the relevant paragraph to Rule 26(b)(5), the court found that waiver of privilege would be appropriate where Rule

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Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials. When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged . . . , the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that , without revealing

information itself privileged . . . will be enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege. . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).

26(b)(5)'s requirements were not met. <u>Id.</u>

The Ninth Circuit then acknowledged that no Circuit has explicitly weighed in on the precise relationship between the requirements of Rule 26(b)(5) and Rule 34's deadline, and noted that a survey of district court cases revealed "a mixed bag," ranging from a permissive approach where boilerplate objections were accepted at any time to a strict approach finding waiver where a party failed to meet a more strict construction of Rule 26(b)(5) within Rule 34's 30-day time limit. Id. at 1148. "In order to honor the spirit of the Rules," the court then concluded that it would "chart a middle road through the wide spectrum of caselaw regarding discovery by reading Rules 26(b)(5) and 34 together. . . " Id. at 1149.

The Ninth Circuit held that boilerplate objections or blanket refusals in response to a Rule 34 request for production of documents are insufficient to assert a privilege. However, it rejected a per se waiver rule that would deem a privilege waived if a privilege log intended to meet Rule 26(b)(5)'s requirements were not produced within Rule 34's 30-day time limit. Id. The court then held that district courts are to use the 30-day deadline for responding to document requests contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 as a "default guideline" to make a "case-by-case determination" of timeliness for meeting Rule 26(b)(5)'s requirements by considering several factors. Id. The factors are: (1) the degree to which the objection or assertion of privilege enables the litigant seeking discovery and the court to evaluate whether each of the withheld documents is privileged; (2) the timeliness of the objection and accompanying information

about the withheld documents; (3) the magnitude of the document production; and (4) other particular circumstances of the litigation that make responding to discovery unusually simple or unusually difficult. <u>Id.</u>

The <u>Burlington</u> factors are generally to be applied "in the context of a holistic reasonableness analysis," aimed at preventing needless waste of time and manipulation of the discovery process. <u>Id.</u> Though the Ninth Circuit stopped short of providing a bright-line rule, the <u>Burlington</u> Court did specifically note that "in the absence of mitigating considerations," a district court would be justified in finding that a party had waived its asserted privileges by submitting a privilege log <u>five months</u> after the Rule 34 deadline. <u>Id.</u>

The instant case seems to be just the sort of case the Ninth Circuit had in mind with that observation. Plaintiffs served their first request for production of documents on May 13, 2004. Defendants responded on June 21, 2004, in part by making numerous assertions of privilege without submitting a contemporaneous privilege log. Defendants correctly point out that plaintiffs have failed to cite any source indicating that such a log "must be tendered contemporaneously with the privilege based objection." (Defs.' Reply Brief Re: Privileged Materials Submitted Under Seal at 3). However, defendants readily acknowledge that they did not produce a privilege log until November 10, 2004, "approximately six months after [p]laintiffs served their first set of document requests, and approximately two months after plaintiffs served their second set of document requests." (Id.) (emphasis added). Under Burlington, defendants'

delay in adequately responding to plaintiff's first request for document production is thus presumptively untimely absent mitigating considerations.

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Nor does it help defendants' case in this regard for them to point out that they submitted a declaration of campus counsel Steve Drown in support of their claims for attorneyclient privilege and work product immunity. (Id.). Defendants fail to mention that the declaration was not signed until August 9, 2005 and not submitted until August 10, 2005, at least a year after the Rule 34 deadline had passed for either set of plaintiffs' document requests. (Id. Ex. A (Drown Decl.)). This late submission only compounds defendants' delay. The same must be said for the declaration of Larry N. Vanderhoef, chancellor of the University of California campus at Davis. That declaration, which attempts to invoke the deliberative process privilege and to provide a factual context for invoking the privilege, was also not signed until August 9, 2005, and not submitted to the court until August 10, 2005. (Id. Ex. B (Vanderhoef Decl.)). court further observes that defendants have not referred it to a single declaration to establish their other <u>privacy-based</u> privileges.

The fact that defendants felt compelled to submit the declarations they did submit to supplement their November 10, 2004 privilege log is also an implicit admission that, without them, the privilege log was insufficient to establish defendants' claimed privilege. See In re Heritage Bond Litig., 2004 WL 19700058 at *2 (party asserting privilege must support application of privilege with competent evidence). This means that the

privileges asserted in response to <u>both</u> plaintiffs' requests for production of documents were not adequately supported until August 10, 2005, well beyond the point under <u>Burlington</u> where defendants were required to present mitigating considerations for their delay.

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Further, defendants have failed to present any mitigating considerations for their delay, apparently relying on plaintiffs' failure to provide relevant citation or, as it turns out, to point them to <u>Burlington</u>. This is unacceptable. court will not neglect to apply the appropriate legal standard simply because the parties have overlooked it. See United States Nat'l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 446 (1993) ("[W]hen an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.") (citation omitted). Defendants delayed demonstrating the applicability of their asserted evidentiary privileges for too long. Nor have they presented any mitigating circumstances for their delay. Therefore, the court finds that defendants have waived their privileges. See Burlington, 408 F.3d at 1149.

Defendants appear to be particularly concerned about documents allegedly protected by the deliberative process privilege. Defendants represent that the documents in question are unrelated to their decision to terminate plaintiff Michael Burch. (See Defs.' Reply Re: Privileged Materials Submitted Under Seal at 8). Therefore, defendants should not be alarmed that plaintiffs will be able to review these documents in

preparing their case. Defendants' primary concern would thus appear to be that the documents at issue contain private correspondence among University personnel regarding University policy - much of it regarding the University's public response to allegations of discrimination - that defendants do not wish to have publicly disclosed. If this is truly defendants' concern, defendants may seek a protective order for any documents for which defendants asserted a deliberative process privilege.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants produce all documents requested in plaintiffs' May 31, 2005 motion to compel for which defendants' have asserted attorney-client, work product, deliberative process, or privacy-based privileges by September 12, 2005.

DATED: August 30, 2005

Silliam Br Shubb

WILLIAM B. SHUBB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE